This paper discusses the origins of the transaction costs of side-contracting. In Tirole (1986)'s model of collusion with a risk averse supervisor, the optimal collusion-proof contract trades-off coalitional incentives against an insurance motive. We characterize the corresponding agency cost and allocative distortions. Identifying this contractual outcome with Tirole (1992)'s model of collusion with exogenous transaction costs provides foundations for those transaction costs. Transaction costs of collusion are stake dependent, linked to the economic environment and function of the collusive agents' degrees of risk preferences. We provide several applications of this theory of transaction costs for organizational design (vertical integration, job allocations, design of supervisory structures, and side-contracting under uncertainty).
Introduction
The bulk of organizational innovations having taken place in large firms over the past century amounts to changes in their supervisory structures.
1 Those changes became highly desirable to accompany the evolutions of those firms both in terms of the scope and the scale of their activities. When a firm grows, expands its scale of production, or when it integrates forwards or backwards new transactions to enlarge its own portfolio of activities, the informational gaps between the firm's owners and decision-makers engaged in the dayto-day control of those activities are likely to be significantly enlarged. The vast increase in the number and complexity of decisions required to coordinate the activities of those large firms calls for some specialization and a specific division of labor between management, supervision and production. The task of filling the informational gaps between the firm's owners and well informed managers at different levels of the hierarchy puts on the front line the supervisory structures adopted by these firms. The design of these supervisory structures is thus a quite crucial ingredient to achieve a better coordination of the firm's activities and to enhance the incentives of the different members of the organization. They may use their discretionary access to information to promote their own goals as well as those of the agents they are supposed to regulate. As it has been documented by a number of sociologists and organization theorists, 3 the work place is the field where various social norms for collective behaviors against the organization's principal emerge and evolve.
How should the internal organization of the firm be designed to minimize the agency costs due to those collusive behaviors among subgroups of agent? Which types of supervisors are more prone to collusive behavior? Given these imperfections of the supervisory system, how should be built the contours of an organization, and in particular the scale and scope of its activities? These are quite crucial questions to be answered both from a theoretical point of view and from a more practical perspective. On the theoretical side, the theory of group incentives is still in its infancy. Even if the principal-agent framework has now offered an impressive body of works helping us to undertand the organization of the firm, 4 this paradigm is still mostly based on the questionable assumption that agents adopt a non-cooperative behavior which clearly favors the designer of the organization.
This assumption is not only unsatisfactory from a theoretical point of view but also it goes against the sociological studies reporting the existence of various informal cliques within organizations. However, we still have a limited knowledge on how multi-agent organizations work when groups of agents may collude to promote their own goals against those of the organization they work with.
The goal of this paper is to investigate how parameters like the size and the scope of the firm's activities, and more generally the agents' preferences and the firm's environment altogether affect the power of collusive cliques within the firm. 5 More specifically, we want to trace out the origins of the transaction costs of collusive side-contracting and show the dependence of those costs on these various parameters. Once these origins are better understood, we can discuss how the design of the organization can possibly be used to increase transaction costs and, by the same token, improve the firm's profit.
To make progress on this difficult topic, we focus on a simple model of the firm as a hierarchy involving a double-edged separation between, on one side, ownership and, on the other side, supervision and production. According to this view of the firm as a twotier hierarchy, a principal, who is at the top of the hierarchy, controls both a supervisor and a productive agent standing at the bottom level. The firm is then viewed as a nexus of contracts: first a grand-contract, linking together the principal, the supervisor and the agent, and, second, an informal collusive side-contract linking only the latter two partners. 6 Because of the separation between ownership and supervision, the supervisor, but not the principal, gets some information on the agent's productivity which can be used to improve the latter's incentives. However, through a collusive side-agreement, this information can be concealed by the supervisor to favor the agent against the principal.
When collusion matters, the principal must design a collusion-proof grand-contract which induces truthful revelation of all the supervisory information.
Within this framework, we provide three different sets of results. First, we generalize Tirole (1986) and discuss how the supervisor's degree of risk aversion is key to understand how the agency cost of collusion evolves. Providing incentives to the supervisor for reporting his information is indeed costly when this supervisor is risk averse. The logic turns out to be similar to the standard moral hazard argument. 7 To satisfy the coalition incentive compatibility constraint, the grand-contract has to let the supervisor bear some risk. However, to induce this supervisor to participate, this grand-contract must also provide him some insurance. A conflict arises between insurance and incentives at the time of designing the grand-contract. Using a CARA specification for the supervisor's utility function, we can fully characterize output distortions and obtain several comparative statics properties with respect to the supervisor's degree of risk aversion and the precision of his signal on the agent's productivity.
Second, we fill a gap in the collusion literature between two of its most quoted papers, namely Tirole (1986) and Tirole (1992) . In the first paper, as in our model below, transferring one unit of bribe from the agent to the supervisor does not involve any deadweight loss. In the second paper, Tirole assumes that there exist some exogenous and unmodeled transaction costs of side-contracting in a model with a risk neutral supervisor protected by limited liability. Given the importance of these transaction costs in the literature, putting them on firmer foundations is desirable. We propose an identification of the optimal contract derived in our model with Tirole (1992) 's result. This identification shows that Tirole (1992) 's short cut is valid as long as the transaction costs of side-contracting take a particular closed form. Transaction costs of side-contracting increase with the stake of the collusive relationship but at a decreasing rate, highlighting therefore the existence of increasing returns to side-contracting.
Third, we use this nonlinear shape of the transaction costs of side-contracting to ana-7 See Mirrlees (1976) , Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979) . Salanié (1990) and Laffont and Rochet (1999) analyze also models of adverse selection with one principal and a single risk averse agent. There exists a trade off between incentivizing the agent to tell the truth and satisfying his ex ante participation constraint when the agent is risk averse. lyze various issues for organizational design. We discuss job allocation in both the private and the public sectors as well as the impact of vertical integration on side-contracting, the design of supervisory structures when the firm extends the scope of its activities and finally, the behavior of coalitions in risky and possibly incomplete contracting environments.
The collusion literature 8 has mostly viewed the informal side-contract between a risk neutral supervisor and his supervisee as being illegal, purely implicit, enforced by word of honor, trust, reciprocity, 9 or through repeated relationships. However, an important weakness of this collusion paradigm is that frictions in side-contracting are exogenous.
This short cut of the exact modeling of the constraints affecting the efficiency of a sidecontract turns out to be sufficient for making significant progresses in a number of important directions.
It was indeed enough to analyze the existence of collusive stakes, the move of incentive schemes towards bureaucratic rules, and more generally, the optimal organizational responses to the threat of collusion. However, this short cut fails to fully capture how the economic environment in which the firm evolves as well as the agent's preferences can have an impact on the transaction costs of side-contracting.
A few papers have somewhat discussed the origins of those transaction costs in frameworks similar to Tirole (1992) . These contributions can be classified into two main subsets:
first, those keeping exogenous transaction costs but making them somewhat dependent on the environment; second, those endogenizing the frictions of side-contracting by looking at imperfect side-contracting environments. In the first class of models, Kofman and Lawarrée (1996) analyzes a situation with two types of supervisors which cannot be screened apart by the principal. It may turn out that, with some probability, the supervisor can be of an "uncorruptible" type. The efficiency of side-contracting is then by definition null.
This framework turns out to be useful as providing a counterexample to the CollusionProofness Principle in hard information environments. In a political economy model of regulation, Laffont and Tirole (1991, Chapter 11 and following) show that the regulatory 8 See Tirole (1986 Tirole ( , 1992 , Kofman and Lawarrée (1993) and Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 11 ) among many others.
9 See Gouldner (1961) for some discussion of the enforcement of these norms of reciprocity within the firm. Fehr, Gachter and Kirchsteiger (1997) argue that selfishness may lead to excessive restrictions in the set of implementable allocations in a two tier principal-agent model and that preferences for reciprocity should be considered. Rotemberg (1994) and Prendergast and Topel (1996) analyze altruism and favoritism in three-tier hierarchies but adopt a partial approach since they do not take into account the optimal organizational response to the threat of these collusions.
response to collusion is to decrease the power of incentives in order to decrease the cost of ensuring collusion-proofness. In this model, regulatory capture by an interest group is socially more costly when the transaction costs of side-contracting with the regulator are lower.
10 Still in a regulatory framework, Laffont and Martimort (1999) show that splitting information between two non-cooperating regulators increases implicitly the transaction costs of side-contracting. In a model with reciprocal supervision, Laffont and Meleu (1997) argue that exchanges of reciprocal favors are easier than asymmetric deals and that a norm of reciprocity is easier to enforce in an organization than a norm of asymmetric collusion. In particular, they show that asymmetric supervision or supervision with limited precision may be optimal because it decreases the probability of the costly state of nature with possible reciprocal favors and small transaction costs of side-contracting.
Lastly, Martimort and Verdier (2000) build a general equilibrium model showing that colluding agents are more willing to divert resources away from productive activities in order to invest into improving collusive technologies when their prospects of remaining entrenched within the firm are larger, i.e., when the rate of creative destruction in the economy is small.
Contributions to the second class of models are even scarcer. Martimort (1997 Martimort ( , 1999 derive conditions making a collusive agreement self-enforceable either when cliques are either horizontal or vertical. The long-run dynamics of the organization is shown to converge towards an outcome similar to that described in a static modelà la Tirole (1992) . The deadweight loss of side-contracting depends on the respective discount rates of the principal and the agents and on the information structure. Martimort and Verdier (1999) applies this theory to a model of Schumpeterian growth linking those discount rates to the rate of innovation in the economy. Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (2000) focus instead on a static principal-supervisor-agent where coalition formation is subject to frictions arising from the existence of asymmetric information. 11 The analysis shows how the principal can actually play on these frictions to limit the efficiency of sidecontracting and to improve the firm's profitability. Finally, Laffont and Martimort (2000) show how asymmetric information within coalitions between symmetric agents may allow 10 Implicit here is the idea that some interest groups can better circumvent the celebrated Olsonian "free riding" problem in collective action than others so that the transaction costs of side-contracting diminish.
11 Baliga (1999) and Felli (1997) also analyze principal-supervisor-agent models with asymmetric information but with soft information. They both propose collusion-proof implementations of the non-collusive outcome in a framework with a risk neutral supervisor. the principal to enlarge significantly the set of implementable allocations.
Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 derives the optimal contract in the case where there is no collusion between the supervisor and the agent. Risk aversion plays no role in this non-cooperative implementation. In Section 4, the optimal collusionproof grand-contract is derived as well as some comparative statics. Section 5 recalls the main assumptions and results of Tirole (1992) 's model of supervision with exogenous transaction costs. Stake dependent transaction costs which identify Tirole (1992) 's model with ours are then immediately obtained. In Section 6, using the characterization of these transaction costs we discuss several issues of organizational design.
The Model

Players and Information
We consider a two-tier model of a firm in which productive and supervisory tasks are split. A principal, for instance the firm's owner, contracts with a productive agent and a supervisor. The separation between ownership, production and supervision is motivated by physical constraints. The principal is unable to perform himself either the productive or the supervisory task because the activities of the firm are large in size or because those tasks require specific skills.
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The agent produces a quantity q of output at a constant marginal cost θ. θ is a piece of private information known only by the agent. It is drawn from a discrete distribution on Θ = {θ 1 , θ 2 } (we denote ∆θ = θ 2 − θ 1 > 0) with respective probabilities ν and 1 − ν.
The supervisor receives a hard information signal σ on the agent's marginal cost.
σ can take either of two possible values: T = {σ 1 , σ 2 } is the set of possible signals.
Conditionally on the fact that the agent is efficient, i.e., θ = θ 1 , the supervisor observes σ 1 with probability . Otherwise, the supervisor observes σ 2 . Hence the joint probabilities p ij on the pairs (θ i , σ j ) are defined respectively as
The supervisor's signal is not observed by the principal, otherwise a supervisor would not be needed. However, this signal is also learned by the agent. Hence, information sets are nested along the hierarchy. "Nature" reveals to the agent both his type and the supervisor's information, only the latter is available to the supervisor while the principal observes none of these.
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Preferences.
We assume that the agent is infinitely risk averse below zero wealth and risk neutral above. For positive payoffs, his utility function writes thus as:
where t is the monetary transfer he receives from the principal. An agent accepts to produce as long as he gets his reservation utility which is normalized w.l.o.g. to zero.
The supervisor is risk averse and has a CARA utility function
where s is the wage he receives from the principal. r = 0 corresponds to the limiting case where the supervisor is risk neutral.
Production of q units of output yields an increasing and concave revenue R(q) to the principal (R (·) > 0 and R (·) ≤ 0). To always insure positive production levels and avoid corner solutions, we assume that the Inada conditions are satisfied, i.e., R (0) = +∞ and R (+∞) = 0. The principal's profit writes as:
Contracts
• Grand-Contracts: The organization is ruled by the principal through a grand-contract GC. ¿From the Revelation Principle, as long as the agent and the supervisor do not 13 This nested information structure is standard in both the literature on collusion and the related literature on delegation in hierarchies (see respectively Tirole (1986 Tirole ( , 1992 and McAfee and McMillan (1995) 
among others).
14 This assumption can be justified by the fact that the supervisory activity consists in performing a certain number of checks on the agent's job and that the agent observes the result of these checks.
15 Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) and Itoh (1993) develop model's of collusion between two risk averse agents in a pure moral hazard context. Prendergast and Topel (1996) analyze a model of favoritism in organizations in a moral hazard context with agents and their supervisor having all CARA utility functions.
collude, there is no loss of generality in restricting the principal to offer truthful direct revelation mechanisms of the kind
m a is the agent's report to the principal. This report belongs to Θ × T . m s is the supervisor's report to the principal which lies instead into T . To make notations simpler, we will denote thereafter t ijk (resp. s ijk and q ijk ) the agent's transfer (resp. the supervisor's transfer and the agent's output) when the agent reports (θ i , σ j ) and the supervisor reports instead
3 . When the agent and the supervisor's reports on σ coincide, we denote also by t ij (resp. s ij and q ij ) this transfer (resp. the supervisor's transfer and the agent's output). We will denote also by u ij = t ij − θ i q ij the agent's informational rent when his type is θ i and the common report of the supervisor and the agent is σ j .
The fact that σ is a hard information signal somewhat limits the possible manipulation of the agent's and the supervisor's reports. Indeed, the agent reports necessarily a type θ 1 when he reports also that the supervisor's signal is σ 1 . Moreover, σ 1 can be concealed and both the supervisor or the agent can pretend that σ 2 has instead realized. However, the reverse is impossible. We denote by φ j the set of reports on θ i compatible with σ j .
From the discussion above, we have thus φ 1 = {θ 1 } and φ 2 = {θ 1 , θ 2 }.
• Collusive Side-Contracts: The side-contract between the supervisor and the agent consists of first, a secret side-transfer τ paid by the agent to the informed supervisor when σ = σ 1 and second, a coordination of the supervisor and the agent's reports on σ to the principal. For simplicity, the regulator has all the bargaining power at the side-contracting stage and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent.
We assume also that the colluding partners are able to commit to this side-contract.
This assumption can be justified by appealing to a "word of honor" or to more general reputational arguments.
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Note also that collusion arises ex post, i.e., after σ 1 is known by both the supervisor and the agent. Collusion takes thus place under symmetric information.
Finally, it is worth stressing that side-contracting suffers a priori from no frictions as in Tirole (1986) . Gains from trade can be fully exploited by the collusive partners. One unit 16 This is clearly a simplifying but standard modeling short cut. It avoids to model explicitly the dynamic relationships between the regulator and the regulated firm which makes the side-contract credible. This assumption is made by most papers in the collusion literature. Assuming perfect enforceability allows us therefore to characterize an upper bound to what can be realized by the collusive partners. See Tirole (1992) and Martimort (1999) for models stressing the self-enforceability of side-contracts.
of bribe taken from the agent is fully pocketed by the supervisor. This assumption distinguishes our analysis from Tirole (1992) , Kofman and Lawarée (1993) , Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 11) , Laffont and Meleu (1997) , Martimort (1999) and Baliga (1999) who all assume some exogenous frictions and deadweight loss in side-contracting.
Timing
The timing of the game of contractual offer cum coalition formation is as follows:
• The principal offers a grand-contract to both the supervisor and the agent.
• The supervisor and the agent both accept or refuse simultaneously this grand-contract at the ex ante stage, i.e., being still uninformed on the agent's type and the supervisor's signal. If any of them refuses, the game ends.
• The agent learns his productivity parameter θ and the supervisor's signal σ. The supervisor learns only σ.
• When σ 1 realizes, the supervisor offers a side-contract to the agent. If the latter refuses, the grand-contract is played non-cooperatively.
• Reports are made, production takes place and transfers within the grand-contract and, possibly, within the side-contract, realize.
Acceptance of the grand-contract by both the supervisor and the agent taking place before the learning of any information, the supervisor's and the agent's ex ante participation constraints must be satisfied by this grand-contract. Importantly, because of our assumption of infinite risk aversion below zero wealth for the agent, the latter's ex ante participation constraint amounts to a set of ex post participation constraints, one in each state of nature.
Note finally that this timing captures the fact that the principal has the maximal ability to commit by designing the contours of the organization before any learning of information.
Benchmarks
Costless Supervision
As a first benchmark, let us consider the case where the principal directly receives the signal σ on the agent's private information. This can be viewed as a stylized model of a small firm in which the supervisory task can be performed by the principal himself.
Alternatively, if we stick to the interpretation of our model as a picture of a large firm in which supervision is needed, everything happens as if the supervisor would costlessly reveal his information to the principal before the latter contracts with the agent.
As it is standard in two-type adverse selection models, the following constraints are of particular importance:
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• The incentive compatibility constraint of an efficient agent when the principal has observed σ 2 :
• The ex ante participation constraint of the infinitely risk averse agent can be decomposed into two relevant ex post participation constraints:
when the principal has observed σ 2 , and
when the principal has instead observed σ 1 .
Accordingly, the optimal contract solves:
subject to (1)- (2) and (3).
Solving this problem yields the conditional optimum defined as:
To reduce the cost of the incentive compatibility constraint (1) and make less valuable for an efficient agent to mimic an inefficient one, the principal reduces only the output produced by an inefficient agent. The efficient agent's output remains equal to its first best value. A positive rent is left to the efficient agent (u
) only when the principal gets an uninformative supervisory signal. The participation constraints (2) and (3) are instead both binding. Finally, as the supervisory information becomes less informative, i.e, as decreases, the output distortion characterized in (5) increases.
Non-Cooperative Implementation
Let us now envision the case where the agent and the supervisor do not collude. The agents report thus their information non-cooperatively to the principal who is uninformed of the realization of σ. We look thus for a truthful Nash equilibrium between the agents.
• When (θ i , σ j ) has been learned by the agent, the agent's incentive compatibility constraint is:
• When σ j has been learned by the supervisor, the supervisor's incentive compatibility constraint is:
Here, we can use the logic of Nash implementation. 19 σ is a piece of shared information between the agent and the supervisor which can be costlessly extracted by the principal by setting s ij j = t ij j = −q ij j = −∞ when reports on σ differ, i.e., when j = j . In this case, (6) can be reduced to the only relevant incentive constraint (1). Similarly, (7) is necessarily satisfied.
Finally, the supervisor's ex ante participation constraint writes as:
The optimal contracting outcome with a non-cooperative behavior between the supervisor and the agent is thus the conditionally optimal outcome described in Section 3.1. Note, in particular, that the supervisor receives always zero wage s ij = 0 for all (i, j) for this outcome. This constant wage reduces the risk borne by the supervisor and relaxes his ex ante participation constraint (13).
If the principal can perfectly control and forbid communication between the agent and the supervisor, he can thus achieve the same outcome as with direct supervision.
Importantly, this result is independent of the supervisor's degree of risk aversion when the agents do not collude.
Collusive Behavior
We now consider the case where the supervisor and the agent collude against the principal when σ = σ 1 has been observed.
Implementable Grand-Contracts
Following Tirole (1986) and Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 11) , the Collusion-Proofness
Principle applies in this hard information environment. There is no loss of generality in restricting the principal to offer collusion-proof grand-contracts. For such a contract, the best side-contract is the null side-contract consisting of no side-transfers and no collective manipulation of the reports made by both the supervisor and the agent when σ = σ 1 .
This last requirement means that the collusion partners must find optimal to report that θ 1 realizes when σ 1 has been observed. To be collusion-proof, a grand-contract must thus satisfy the following coalition incentive compatibility constraints:
and s 11 + u 11 ≥ s 22 + u 22 + ∆θq 22 .
Note that (1) will still be binding at the optimal collusion-proof grand-contract because there is no need to give some extra rent to an efficient agent when the supervisor reports truthfully having observed no informative signal. When this latter constraint is binding, the more stringent constraint between (9) and (10) is that obtained for the highest of the two wages s 12 and s 22 . The principal cannot implement any difference between those two transfers without having the coalition pretend to be in the state of nature with the highest supervisory wage. Henceforth, the principal loses much flexibility in the regulator's wage and we have necessarily:
where s 2 is a constant wage received by the supervisor whenever he claims having observed nothing.
The relevant coalition incentive compatibility constraint writes thus as:
Using this simplification in wages, we can also rewrite the supervisor's ex ante participation constraint as:
The Optimal Collusion-Proof Grand-Contract
The principal maximizes the firm's expected profit subject to coalition incentive, individual incentive and participation constraints. The optimal grand-contract solves thus the following problem (denoted thereafter by (P )):
subject to constraints (1)- (2)- (3)- (12) and (13).
Proposition 1 : The optimal collusion-proof grand-contract entails:
• Constraints (1)- (2)- (3)- (12) and (13) 
• The supervisor's wages in the different states of nature are respectively given by: Holmstrom (1979) , Shavell (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983) among others. 21 See Salanié (1990) and Laffont and Rochet (1999) .
principal only if he receives a risk premium. Now, the principal faces a trade-off between providing incentives against collusive manipulation and giving some insurance to the supervisor. The total risk borne by the supervisor depends on the production plan. The greater the output q 22 , the riskier is the lottery faced by the supervisor. As a result, distorting downward this output becomes now necessary to decrease the cost of the coalition incentive compatibility constraint.
Comparative Statics
This section discusses how the optimal response of the organization changes with the central parameters of the model.
• Risk Aversion: For the case of risk neutrality, the principal finds it costless to use a supervisor to obtain the informative signal σ. There exists a system of state-dependent rewards and punishments which induces revelation of information at no extra cost with respect to the case without collusion. The contractual outcome is indeed the same as in Section 3.1. This result parallels those of Laffont and Martimort (1998) and Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (2000) . These latter papers analyze hierarchical structures with either two productive agents or one productive agent and a supervisor. Even when the agents collude against the principal, 22 the principal can implement the same outcome as without collusion as long as the agents are both risk neutral. The logic of the analysis is the same. As long as insurance and incentives do not conflict, collusion remains costless for the principal. 23 Let us now characterize more generally how risk aversion affects the optimal production plan. 
22 Collusion takes place under asymmetric information in those latter papers. 23 With risk neutrality, Tirole (1986) shows also that the principal can make the supervisor residual claimant and achieve the collusion-free outcome. He also argues that this result does not hold any more with soft information and collusion. In Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (2000) , we extend Tirole's result to the case where the supervisor's information is soft. Making the supervisor residual claimant for the hierarchy's profit still continues to be optimal even when collusion takes place under asymmetric information.
With a risk averse supervisor, the principal must provide costly insurance and output has to be downward distorted to limit the risk borne by the supervisor. The more risk averse the supervisor, the more important the insurance concern and the larger are the output distortions. q c 22 (r) is more and more distorted away from its value obtained with risk neutrality as r increases. In the limit, the supervisor's information is not used any more and everything happens as if the information collected by the supervisor had no value.
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• Accuracy of the Supervisory Information: Taking risk aversion as given, we now investigate what is the effect of improving the precision of the supervisory signal. 
Proposition 3 : When increases towards 1 (perfectly informative signal), the inefficient agent's output q
With no supervisory signal, i.e., = 0, the three agent organization reduces down to a standard principal-agent pair where the principal benefits from no supervisory information. Note that this outcome is the same as that obtained with an infinitely risk averse and informed supervisor who cannot be incentivized to report his information to the principal.
Therefore, when the supervision technology becomes instead perfect, ( converging to one), an inefficient agent produces an output which is exactly the same as the one which would be implemented by the principal in a direct relationship with a productive agent having a degree of risk aversion r and in the absence of any supervisory information.
As the supervisor gets a more precise signal, the behavior of his coalition with the agent looks more alike what Baron and Besanko (1999) calls an "informational alliance".
Such an agreement between the agents corresponds to a strong norm of collusion which takes place before the agents learn productive types and supervisory signals. Through such an ex ante side-contracting, the agents would not only credibly share their pieces of information but also, in the case of risk averse agents, would also be able to share risks and behave just as one single "merged" agent. In the case where the supervisor and the agent have both CARA utility functions with respective degrees of risk aversion r and ρ, it is easy to show that this "merged" agent would have also CARA preferences with a degree 24 A similar result is proved in Tirole (1986, Proposition 4 . With our extreme assumption of an infinite risk aversion for the agent (ρ = ∞), such an organizational alliance between agents would therefore adopt exactly the same behavior as that of a productive agent with a risk aversion equal to that of the supervisor, i.e., r. When supervisory gets more precise, ex ante and ex post side-contractings look more alike since the supervisor faces less risk in his relationship with the agent.
More formally, (12) shows that collusion consists in mimicking a state of nature which is less likely as the supervisory signal gets more precise. It becomes less costly for the principal to reduce the right-hand-side of (12) by offering a relatively negative wage s c 2 to the supervisor. Simultaneously, the principal is less obliged to use downward distortions of the ouput to relax this collusion-proofness constraint. To confirm this, it is enough to observe that the supervisor gets a increasingly negative wage when he reports having observed nothing (s c 2 decreases as converges to one as it can be shown on (16)).
Identifying the Transaction Costs of Collusion
Following Tirole (1992) , the collusion literature has most often assumed that there exist some exogenous frictions in side-contracting. These frictions, or transaction costs of sidecontracting, impede the achievement of ex post efficiency in side-contracting. One unit of bribe from the agent yields less than a one unit of benefit to the supervisor. These transaction costs represent an essential parameter of most models since varying their values allows various comparative static exercices. Collusion is less detrimental for the organization as transaction costs of side-contracting are greater. When designing the best incentive package within an organization, the principal may be as well willing to structure the organization in order to increase the value of these transaction costs and make collusion easier to fight.
Given the importance of those transaction costs, our objective, in this section, is to provide firmer foundations for this concept. Doing so, we derive below some closed form expressions for these transaction costs by simply identifying Tirole (1992) 's results with those developed in Section 4.
We first start by recasting the main ingredients in Tirole (1992)'s three-tier hierarchical model:
• The supervisor is risk neutral for positive wealth and infinitely risk averse below zero wealth. An alternative interpretation is that the supervisor is protected by limited liability.
• The information structure is the same as that described in Section 2.
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• The collusive agreement specifies the bribes the supervisor will receive when he has observed but does not report σ 1 to the principal. The supervisor is given all bargaining power at the collusion stage and can extract the efficient agent's rent differential between what he gets when σ 2 is revealed and what he gets when σ 1 is instead announced. This bribe amounts to b = u 12 −u 11 = ∆θq 22 . However, because of frictions in side-contracting, the benefit from colluding with the agent and exchanging a bribe b is only k 0 b where k 0 is a constant number which is less than one.
More generally and contrary to Tirole (1992) and all other papers in this literature, we assume below that the efficiency of side-contracting is stake-dependent. Typically, the There is no difficulty in proving the Collusion-Proofness Principle in such a framework even if transaction costs are stake dependent. As long as k (b) < 1 for all b, the principal finds marginally less costly to pay the supervisor for having him report an informative supervisory signal than to pay directly the agent to induce him to reveal the same information.
25 Stricto sensu, the monitoring technology available to the supervisor in Tirole (1986 Tirole ( , 1992 is different from that used in our paper. In Tirole model, the supervisor may observe or not the true type of the agent whatever the realization of this type. However, since an inefficient agent receives zero rent from the optimal contract, collusion is never a concern with this type since there is no gain for the agent from having the supervisor hide his signal. Collusion is instead only relevant when the supervisor observes that the firm is efficient. Indeed, the efficient agent gets some rent which can be shared with an informed supervisor. Our model simplifies significantly the information structure and the notations by only considering the possibility that the supervisor learns that the agent is efficient.
Optimal Contract in Tirole (1992)'s Model
Making transaction costs stake dependent in Tirole (1992) 's model, the coalition incentive constraint which must be satisfied by the grand-contract to induce revelation of σ 1 by the supervisor writes therefore as:
Moreover, the infinitely risk averse supervisor's ex ante participation constraint also requires that the following constraints are satisfied:
and
The optimal grand-contract with hard information is obtained therefore as a solution to the following program (denoted thereafter by (H)):
subject to (1)- (2)- (3)- (18)- (19) and (20).
26
Solving (H) yields immediately the following proposition.
Proposition 4 : The optimal collusion-proof grand-contract in Tirole (1992)'s model entails:
• Constraints (1)- (2)- (3)- (18)- (19) and (20) • A decreasing schedule of outputs with no distortion for the most efficient agent 
First, we observe that the conditional optimum is still obtained when k(b) = 0 for all b.
The transaction costs of side-contracting are then so large that no collusive agreement can be enforced between the agents. Consequently, we are back to the case of a direct supervision or, equivalently, to the case of a non-cooperative behavior between the agents.
More generally, to reduce the cost of the collusion-proofness constraint, the principal must also distort q 22 downwards. This distortion is all the more important that k(b) is sensitive to a bribe reduction. Hence, the shape of k(b) is key to determine the optimal response of the organization to the threat of collusion.
Transaction Costs
To characterize the shape of k(·), we now identify the contractual outcome derived in Proposition 1 with Tirole's results sketched in Proposition 4. Optimal outputs can be identified by a direct comparison of the corresponding first order conditions. To obtain such an exact identification, it is sufficient that k(·) solves the following differential equation:
with the initial condition k(0) = 0. 27 Integrating (22) yields immediately the following formula for the efficiency of side-contracting, where we make explicit its dependence on the supervisor's degree of risk aversion:
for any collusive stake b. We observe that k(b, r) is an increasing function of b with a slope which is always less than one. Henceforth, transaction costs of side-contracting increase as the collusive stake itself increases. However, average transaction costs decrease as b increases. Collusion becomes, on average, easier to enforce when stakes are greater.
Moreover, k(b, r) is convex in b. Transaction costs of side-contracting increase thus at a marginally decreasing rate. There exists increasing returns to scale in the collusive agreement. Henceforth, a coalition finds certainly more costly to transfer bribes as those bribes increase but larger bribes are, at the margin, easier to transfer than small ones.
Small Risks
When the bribe b to be exchanged between the supervisor and the agent is small enough, the efficiency of side-contracting is obtained through the following approximation:
Starting from this equation and coming back to the solution of (P ), we can get a better intuition about the stake-dependency of transaction costs in the case of small risks. After some easy computations, the (binding) participation constraint of the supervisor (13) can be written as (16). Using Taylor expansions for ∆θ small enough, i.e., for a small risk on the supervisor's payoff, we find that:
The first term on the right-hand-side of (25) represents the negative supervisor's wage received in the case of risk neutrality when the agent is efficient and the supervisor reports having observed nothing to the principal. The second term on this right-hand-side is actually the risk premium that the principal must pay to the risk averse supervisor to have him accept the grand-contract. As s c 2 is paid with probability 1 − ν and s c 11 is paid with probability ν , 28 the overall extra agency cost due to risk aversion, i.e., the expected excess wage paid to the supervisor with respect to what he receives in the absence of collusion, becomes then:
It is easy to check that the right-hand-side of (26) represents also the expected wage ν s h 11 insuring collusion-proofness in Tirole's model if we assume that the efficiency of side-contracting is now given by (24). This comparison between the agency cost of the two models in the limit of small risks pushes further the view that the agency costs of collusion are linked to the insurance problem faced by the supervisor. The extra cost of inducing collusion-proofness can be interpreted as the risk premium which must be paid to the supervisor to have him accept the risky lottery of wages requested by the collusion-proof grand-contract. 
Endogenous Transaction Costs and Organizational Design
In this section, we derive from our previous analysis new insights about a number of important issues for organizational design. Indeed, faced with the problem of better designing the incentive package ruling a firm or a public organization, a principal must figure out how the internal design of this organization affects the transaction costs of side-contracting. In a multi-agent context, designing the organization to increase the transaction costs of side-contracting should be viewed as a complementary tool to a better set of individual incentives.
Job Allocation in the Private and the Public Sectors
Our analysis has stressed that transaction costs of side-contracting decrease with the supervisor's degree of risk aversion. When faced with the problem of allocating different agents along the hierarchy, the principal of an organization should always put the less risk averse agent at the supervisory task so that collusion becomes more difficult (assuming of course that agents are otherwise identical, i.e., both are equally able to perform either the supervisory or the productive task). In particular, to the extent that the public sector attracts agents who self-select as being more risk averse than in the private sector, one may also argue that public enterprises are more prone to lower powered incentives than private enterprises.
More generally, the consequences of our results for the analysis of the public sector are quite promising. In the public sector, regulatory agencies perform the supervisory tasks and regulated firms the productive ones. According to Wilson (1989) , civil servants within those agencies are of basically three sorts. They may be "politicians" interested in pursing a political life after their civil servancy, "specialists" coming from the industry they are supposed to regulate, or "careerists" who are just interested by a career in the civil servancy. As suggested by Lewis and Sappington (1995) , the assumption of risk aversion at the regulators' level can be justified in the case where those regulators control projects which represent a large share of their portfolios of activities. Leyden and Link (1998) suggest also that governments offer to their bureaucrats budget functions which are concave and that it makes these bureaucrats behave as risk averse agents. risk aversion. To the extent that specialists are likely to be less risk averse than politicians or careerists, taking them as head of agencies should better insulate the regulatory policy from the threat of capture.
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The Irrelevance of Supervisory Structures
We have so far shown that the technology of side-contracting exhibits increasing returns.
To have a better idea of the best choice for supervisory structures, it is also important to understand whether the technology of side-contracting exhibits some sort of economies or diseconomies of scope.
31 Indeed, one can view the organization of supervision within the firm as the choice of the best portfolios of activities which must be respectively under the control of each supervisor. Instead of providing a general theory of these optimal portfolios, we provide now a simple example in which the supervisory structure is actually irrelevant.
Suppose that the firm is involved in producing two lines of products which are techno- If a single supervisor is chosen to control both products, he will receive a wage s ij + s kl with probability p ij p kl when information on product line 1 is {θ i , σ j } and information on product line 2 is {θ k , σ l }. The supervisor's ex ante participation constraint in this multi-task environment writes thus as:
In such a context, collusive side-contracts between the common supervisor and each productive agent are only bilateral. This means that coalition incentive constraints take the same form as previously and write as (12) where s 2 is the constant wage received by the supervisor when he claims having observed nothing on any of the activities.
Note that the supervisor's ex ante participation constraint writes thus as:
since the supervisor may have observed either two informative signals, only one, or none.
Maximizing the principal's expected profit with the standard agent's individual incentive (1) and participation (2) and (3) constraints, the coalitional constraint (12) and the supervisor's participation constraint (28), we obtain that the choice of the supervisory structure is irrelevant for the principal. The assumption of the supervisor having CARA preferences matters a lot for this equivalence result. With a CARA utility function, adding independent risks has no effect on the supervisor's risk aversion which remains constant. Indeed, when the supervisor is already subject to a first risky wage lottery which is needed to prevent collusion with the agent producing good 1, preventing further collusion with the agent producing good 2 is no more costly than if the supervisor were not controlling the first activity at all. Of course, this would not be true any more with other utility functions. The risky wage lottery needed to prevent collusion on product line 1 has a certainty equivalent which certainly shifts the supervisor's degree of risk aversion and affects the cost of preventing collusion on product line 2.
Of course, perturbating the information structure by having the agents' types and the supervisor's signals being correlated might invalidate this irrelevance result. We conjecture that a positive correlation between the shocks affecting both product lines would make harder to satisfy the ex ante participation constraint of a unique supervisor than the pair of participation constraints of two different supervisors. Instead, a negative correlation should tilt the organizational choice towards integration of the supervisory tasks.
We could even push further the interpretation of our results. Let us assume that the firm is not involved in marketing two products but that its activities are decomposed into two tasks which are respectively cost oriented and demand oriented. Then, in the absence of any correlation between those activities, the choice between a U-form or a M-form is irrelevant. Instead, a positive (resp. negative) correlation between the pieces of supervisory information on cost and demand certainly calls for separation (resp. integration) of the related supervisory tasks. In the case of positive correlation, a M-form organization should thus emerge. More generally, in this framework with risk-aversion, the general theory of organizing supervisory structures should closely looks like and complements the theory of organizing productive tasks put forward by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) in a pure moral hazard context. Williamson (1985, Chapter 6) argues that vertical integration improves communication channels but that it is also associated with lower powered incentives than those implemented between units owned separately. 32 One key observation put forward by this author is that large integrated firms are more prone to bureaucratic failures than small separated units. To obtain some insights about the bureaucratization of large integrated firms, let us now slightly reframe our model in the framework of the vertical integration literature.
Side-Contracting and Vertical Integration
A principal, who is the owner of a buying unit (the supervisor), contracts for the provision of a good with a selling unit (the agent). Under vertical separation, the selling unit remains outside the firm's boundaries and the supervisory technology is inefficient.
Indeed, the supervisor learns that the agent is efficient only with a positive probability s . Suppose now that this downstream unit is vertically integrated. Following Arrow (1975), we assume that integration is associated with an improvement in the precision of supervisory information. The supervisor gets now information with a greater probability
The current view in the vertical integration literature is that the distribution of ownership, i.e., the choice between vertical integration and vertical separation, does not change 32 A different view has been put forward by Grossman and Hart (1986) who defend the idea that integration is unlikely to change the information structure. However, their analysis focuses on integration between owner-managed firms. Aghion and Tirole (1997) show instead how ownership can affect incentives to acquire information. the set of available grand-contracts to the principal. We certainly agree with this point.
However, it seems to us quite reasonable to also assume that this distribution nevertheless affects the set of side-contracts between the supervisor and the agent.
33 Indeed, because they are short term, subject to opportunism and possibly less frequent than inside-firm relationships, market relationships are less favorable to the developments of the social relationships which are the glue needed to enforce collusion between these agents. Of course, making this point in a full-fledged model would require a repeated game framework. In our static model, we take the convenient and tractable short cut that there is no collusion between the supervisor and the agent under vertical separation. The output distortion is then given by (5) with = s . Under vertical integration, collusion between the supervisor and the agent becomes feasible and the output distortion is now given by (14) with = i .
¿From (21), vertical integration comes with lower powered incentives than vertical separation only when:
where we make explicit the dependence of the efficiency of side-contracting on i . When the latter inequality holds, an improvement in the information structure is more than offset by the fact that collusion emerges also within the integrated organization. Vertical integration dominates vertical separation only when the efficiency of side-contracting is not very sensitive to bribes ( ∂k ∂b (∆θq 22 , r, i ) ≈ 0) so that (29) is reversed. This case is more likely to occur when k(·) is small, i.e., when the buying unit is almost risk neutral or when the spread of uncertainty ∆θ, and thus the bribes exchanged are rather small.
Long Term and Short Term Contractings
The nonlinearity of transaction costs has also important consequences on the behavior of firms in risky environments. Keeping in mind the reduced form for the efficiency of side-contracting obtained in (23), we now investigate how uncertainty in the environment, the ability of the principal to commit or not to a long term grand-contract and the scope for collusion between agents altogether interact.
To model a risky environment, let us suppose that the principal's revenue is now 33 See Bac (1996) for a hierarchical model with a trade-off between external and internal collusion.
subject to a multiplicative random shock β: βR(q) goes to the principal where β ∈ {β,β} with respective probabilities µ and 1 − µ.
We analyze two contracting environments. In a complete contracting environment, β is ex ante contractible. The principal can commit to a pair of grand-contracts contingent on the future realization of this shock. In particular, the targeted outputs q ij (β) and thus the profile of informational rents u ij (β) and the supervisor's wages s ij (β) are now dependent on the possible realizations of β. Under complete contracting, the collusive partners commit also to their collusive strategies. Collusion between the supervisor and the agent takes now place ex ante, i.e., before the realization of β but still after the agent and the supervisor have learned their respective pieces of information. In this case, this is the expected informational rent that the efficient agent can get which matters for determining what is transfered in a side-contract between the supervisor and the agent In a Tirole model with stake dependent transaction costs, the ex ante collusion-proofness constraint writes thus as:
where s 12 (β) = 0 at the optimal contract and E β (·) denotes the expectation operator with respect to β. The expected cost C a of ensuring collusion-proofness under complete contracting and ex ante collusion depends only on the efficiency of side-contracting evaluated at the expected informational rent, namely:
C a = ν k(∆θE β (q 22 (β))).
In an incomplete contracting environment, β is not ex ante contractible but becomes verifiable ex post. The principal can only offer a grand-contract to the agents after β gets known.
Under incomplete contracting, collusion can now only occur ex post, i.e., after the realization of β. In a Tirole model with stake dependent transaction costs, the ex post collusion-proofness constraint writes thus as:
where again s 12 (β) = 0 at the optimal contract. Taking expectations over β, the expected cost C p of ensuring collusion-proofness under incomplete contracting and ex post collusion depends on the expected efficiency of side-contracting:
Because of the increasing returns from side-contracting, we have C p > C a since k(·) is strictly convex. Finally, collusion is strictly more costly to prevent when it takes place under incomplete contracting.
Had we assumed instead constant average transaction costs of side-contracting, the two contracting environments could not have been distinguished. There would indeed be no agency loss for the principal coming from the non-verifiability of β. When transaction costs of side-contracting are concave, complete contracting reduces instead the efficiency of side-contracting. Through a complete set of contracts, the principal can provide enough insurance to the supervisor to make it less risk averse and reduce the impact of collusion on the organization.
Under complete contracting, the principal commits to smooth somewhat the fluctuations in outputs in comparison with the case of short-term contracting. Again this point may be quite relevant for the theory of vertical integration. It has often been argued 34 that vertical integration provides insurance in uncertain environments. A principal who vertically integrates a supervisor-agent structure is better able to write long-term grandcontracts and to shift the nature of side-contracting. Not only the vertically integrated structure reduces the cost of collusion-proofness but it also limits output fluctuations.
This stabilization efffect secures the production channels of the agent and this can improve the agent's incentive to perform specific investments.
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• First note that (2) must be binding to reduce the cost of (1). Moreover, to reduce the right-hand-side of (12), (1) must be binding.
• Hence, we can rewrite (12) as:
Taking first outputs as given, the principal's problem becomes:
Max {u 11 ,s 11 ,s 2 } ν (R(q 11 ) − θ 1 q 11 − u 11 − s 11 ) + ν(1 − )(R(q 12 ) − θ 1 q 12 − s 2 − ∆θq 22 ) +(1 − ν)(R(q 22 ) − θ 2 q 22 − s 2 ) subject to (3)-(32) and (13).
We denote by α, λ and µ the respective multipliers of these constraints.
• Optimizing with respect to u 11 , s 11 and s 2 yields respectively:
−ν + λ + µν v (s 11 ) = 0,
Summing (34) and (35) yields:
µ ν e −rs 11 + (1 − ν )e −rs 2 = 1.
Note first that, (36) implies that µ > 0 and thus (13) is binding. Using that v(·) is CARA, we obtain from (13) that ν e −rs 11 + (1 − ν )e −rs 2 = 1 and thus µ = 1. ¿From (33), we deduce that λ < ν and, using (34) , α > 0. Hence,
Using (13) and (15), we get: e −rs 2 1 − ν + ν e r(s 2 −s 11 ) = 1.
Necessarily, λ > 0. Indeed, otherwise, s 11 = s 2 = 0 and (32) would be violated. Finally, using (37),
Inserting this latter condition into (38) yields (16). (39) yields (15).
• Optimizing with respect to outputs yields (14).
Proof of Proposition 3:
Immediate derivation of (14) 
Hence dq c 22 dr (r) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4:
It is immediate and thus omitted.
Proof of Proposition 5:
The proof follows similar lines to those of Proposition 1. We use symmetry between product lines to simplify notations below. Taking again outputs as given, the principal's problem becomes:
Max {u 11 ,s 11 ,s 2 } (ν ) 2 (2R(q 11 ) − 2θ 1 q 11 − 2u 11 − 2s 11 ) +2ν 2 (1 − )(R(q 11 ) + R(q 12 ) − θ 1 (q 12 + q 11 ) − s 2 − s 11 − ∆θq 22 ) +(ν(1 − )) 2 (2R(q 22 ) − 2θ 2 q 22 − 2s 2 ) subject to (3)- (32) and (28).
Again, we denote by α, λ and µ the respective multipliers of these constraints.
Optimizing with respect to the supervisor's wages and summing the corresponding first order conditions, we get:
µ ν e −rs 11 + (1 − ν )e −rs 2 2 = 1.
Using that v(·) is CARA, we obtain also from (28) that ν e −rs 11 + (1 − ν )e −rs 2 2 = 1.
Thus µ = 1. From the fact that (32) and (28) are binding, we obtain the same values for s 11 and s 2 than in the case of Proposition 1.
